Abstract. The asymptotic behavior of the solution of a differential inclusion provides a simple proof of a minmax theorem.
Introduction
Consider a zero-sum game (I, J, A) where I = {1, ..., } (resp. J = {1, ..., m}) is the set of pure strategies of player 1 (the maximizer), (resp. of player 2 (the minimizer)) and A is the × m payoff matrix. Denote by X and Y the sets of mixed strategies of player 1 and 2 (i.e., X and Y are the unit simplices in IR and in IR m , respectively). Hence, if x ∈ X and y ∈ Y are the players' mixed actions, the payoff is xAy = ij x i A ij y j . Assume that max X min Y xAy = 0. We prove that min Y max X xAy ≤ 0.
The proof is based on an approximation of a discrete dynamics 1 related to Blackwell's approachability procedure (Blackwell, 1956; Sorin, 2002) , by a continuous one, in the spirit of Benaim, Hofbauer and Sorin (2003) . The goal of player 2 is to ensure that the payoff corresponding to any pure strategy of player 1 is less than or equal to zero. In other words, that the state (in the vector payoff space) will reach the negative orthant. At any point in time the current error, from player 2's point of view, is the difference between the time-average state and its projection on the negative orthant. As in approachability theory, the strategy of player 2 is a function of this error. In particular, the dynamics depends only on the behavior of player 2.
Other dynamical approaches have been used to prove the minmax theorem. Brown and von Neumann (1950) introduced a differential equation for two person symmetric zero-sum games. The variable is a symmetric mixed strategy that converges to the set of optimal strategies. Other procedures (e.g., fictitious play, Robinson (1951) ) exhibit similar properties for non-symmetric games while the state variable is in the product space of mixed strategy. In these procedures the dynamics of each player's strategy depends, at each instant, on both players' strategies. In contrast, our dynamics is autonomous: it is defined over the vector payoff space of player 2 (i.e., the -dimensional vectors -a payoff for each pure strategy of player 1) and does not involve player's 1 behavior.
A discrete dynamics
Consider a sequence {y n } of player 2's mixed strategies and letȳ n be the average of its n first elements. Thus,
The corresponding sequence of vector payoffs, g n = Ay n ∈ IR , satisfies:
For any g ∈ IR define g + = (g + 1 , ..., g + n ) by g + k = max(g k , 0). If g + = 0, then g + is proportional to some x ∈ X, and thus, by assumption, there exists y ∈ Y that satisfies xAy ≤ 0, which implies g + , Ay ≤ 0. Define a correspondence N from IR to Y by:
The values of N are non-empty. Furthermore, N is an upper semi-continuous correspondence with compact convex values. The discrete dynamics, respectively in the space of player 2's mixed strategies and vector payoffs are defined by (3) y n+1 ∈ N (Aȳ n ) and g n+1 ∈ AN (ḡ n ).
The theorem and its proof
We turn now to the formal presentation of the theorem and its proof. Proof. Let D denote the negative orthant, IR − , and let C = AY , which is a compact convex image of Y . Consider the continuous dynamics in the vector payoffs space defined by the following differential inclusion (note the similarity to equation (3)):
Since N is an upper semi-continuous correspondence with non-empty compact convex values, there exists a solution g(t) of (4) (see e.g., Theorem 3, p. 98 in Aubin and Cellina (1984) ). When g(t) is on the boundary of C, g(t) points inside C. Thus, if g(0) ∈ C, then g(t) ∈ C for all t ≥ 0 (see e.g., Theorem 5.7, p. 129 in Smirnov (2002) ).
Let Z(g) = g + 2 be the square of the distance from a point g ∈ IR to D. Hence, ∇Z(g) = 2g + . Let z(t) = Z(g(t)), theṅ
where the inequality is dueġ(t) + g(t) ∈ AN (g) and g + , Ay ≤ 0 for any y ∈ N (g). Thus, z(t) (hence the distance between g(t) and D) decreases exponentially to 0 and if it reaches 0 it keeps this value.
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Any accumulation point, g * , of g(t) (as t → ∞) satisfies Z(g * ) = 0, which means that g * ∈ D. Since g * ∈ C, there exists y * with Ay * ∈ D, as desired.
Remark: The proof immediately extends to the case where X is a finite dimensional simplex, Y is a convex compact subset of a topological vector space and the payoff is a real bilinear function on X × Y , continuous on Y for each x ∈ X.
